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THE ABANDONED SPOUSE: ALIMONY AND
SUPPORT ACTIONS, AND THE
MARYLAND LONG ARM STATUTE
GARY IGAL STRAUSBERG*
INTRODUCTION

In a series of cases in the past decade, the Maryland Court of
Appeals has gradually expanded the scope of Maryland's long arm
statute.' These cases have established broad availability of personal
jurisdiction over non-resident defendants in actions arising out of
tortious conduct or commercial transactions. However, the development of jurisdictional standards for domestic relations cases has
proved to be more complex and less satisfactory. One part of the
problem has been the absence of a basis for assertion of personal
jurisdiction over a deserting spouse in an alimony action.
Traditionally, jurisdiction to grant divorce has been based
simply on the domicile of one of the parties in the forum state. 2 In
order to grant alimony or support, however, a court must obtain
personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 3 These rules have caused
hardship in cases in which one spouse has abandoned his or her
family and has moved permanently to another jurisdiction.4 If there
* B.A., 1969, Brooklyn College; J.D., 1972, George Washington University;
LL.M., 1975, Harvard University; Associate, Melnicove, Kaufman & Weiner,
Baltimore, Maryland. The author wishes to thank Joseph S. Kaufman, Esq., for the
opportunity to serve as co-counsel in Bartell v. Bartell, 278 Md. 12, 357 A.2d 343 (1976),
which provided the inspiration for this article.
1. See, e.g., Krashes v. White, 275 Md. 549, 556-59, 341 A.2d 798, 802-04 (1975);
Lamprecht v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 262 Md. 126, 277 A.2d 272 (1971); Groom v.
Margulies, 257 Md. 691, 265 A.2d 249 (1970); Harris v. Arlen Properties, Inc., 256 Md.
185, 260 A.2d 22 (1969).
2. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 229-30 (1945). See generally H.
CLARK, THE LAw OF DOMESTIc RELATIONS 285-313 (1968).
3. H. CLARK, supra note 2, at 314-19.
4. For a more complete analysis of the complexities of this situation, see Note,
Long-Arm Jurisdictionin Alimony and Custody Cases, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 289 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Long-Arm Jurisdictionl.
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is no basis for personal jurisdiction, the abandoned spouse may well
be unable to obtain an alimony judgment in the state of the former
matrimonial domicile. The abandoned spouse thus may be forced to
undergo the great burden and inordinate expense of litigation in the
state where the deserting spouse is domiciled. Even if the abandoned
spouse does obtain an alimony decree at home, the questionable
jurisdictional basis of the decree and the complexities of the full
faith and credit clause5 may make it difficult to enforce the judgment
6
in another state.

Courts in a number of jurisdictions have alleviated this problem
by applying long arm statutes to allow jurisdiction over the vagrant
7
spouse in an alimony action. In the recent case of Bartell v. Bartell,
such a construction of the Maryland long arm statute was urged
before the Maryland Court of Appeals, but the court found it
unnecessary to reach the jurisdictional issue. The pressing need for a
resolution of this problem ensures that it will require further
consideration.
THE PROBLEM:

THE MINIMUM CONTACTS THEORY AND THE
LONG ARM STATUTES

Historically, personal jurisdiction was founded on physical
power. In 1877, the United States Supreme Court declared in
Pennoyer v. Nef/ that "every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction
and sovereignty over persons

. .

within its territory," and that "no

State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons...
without its territory."9 The Court made it clear that these traditional
limits on jurisdiction were required by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. 10 Personal jurisdiction was constitutionally
valid only where the defendant was served personally within the
jurisdiction, or where the defendant actually consented to service of
process."
5. U.S.

CONST.

art. IV,

§ 1.

6. See Long-Arm Jurisdiction,supra note 4, at 289.
7. 278 Md. 12, 357 A.2d 343 (1976).
8. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
9. Id. at 722. To the extent that Pennoyer rests upon the proposition that
jurisdiction is grounded *on the existence of physical power over the litigant or
contested property, its precedential value has been undermined by the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Shaffer v. Heitner, 45 U.S.L.W. 4849 (U.S. June 24, 1977). In
Shaffer, the Court held that all jurisdictional inquiries were to be guided by the due
process standards of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). For a
discussion of InternationalShoe, see text accompanying notes 14 to 16 infra.
10. 95 U.S. at 733. See Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and
the In Personam Jurisdictionof State Courts: From Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review,
25 U. Ci. L. REV. 569, 572-73 (1958).
11. 95 U.S. at 733. Accord, McSherry v. McSherry, 113 Md. 395, 77 A. 653 (1910).
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This restrictive view of jurisdiction was developed in the context
of a society in which most citizens spent all their lives "within the

2
territorial limits of the sovereign to whom they owed allegiance."1
However, as society became more mobile, business and personal
affairs began to overlap jurisdictional boundaries, and the concept
enunciated in Pennoyer was eroded by necessity. The courts
developed a series of fictions to inject flexibility into the doctrine of
physical power. 13 Finally, in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,1 4 the Supreme Court adopted a new analysis for the constitutional delimitation of personal jurisdiction over non-resident
defendants. The key language has become familiar:

[Dlue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant
to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the
territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it
such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "tradi15
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
The new test was neither "mechanical" nor "quantitative":
"[w]hether due process is satisfied must depend rather upon the
quality and nature of the [defendant's] activity in relation to the fair
and orderly administration of the laws which it is the purpose of the
16
due process clause to insure."
Four subsequent decisions by the Supreme Court applied and
17
elaborated the InternationalShoe "minimum contacts" analysis.
As many commentators have recognized, these cases were not
completely consistent.1 8 For example, in McGee v. InternationalLife
Insurance Co.,1 9 two new .criteria were added to the "minimum
contacts" analysis. The Court concentrated on the relationship
12. Johnston, The Fallacy of Physical Power, 1 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 37, 44
(1967).
13. See generally Auerbach, The "Long Arm" Comes to Maryland,26 MD. L. REV.
13, 14 (1966); Kurland, supra note 10, at 573-86.
14. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
15, Id. at 316 (citations omitted).
16. Id. at 319. Similarly, the Court stated that jurisdiction was proper where there
was "such contacts of the [defendant] with the state of the forum as make it
reasonable, in the context of our federal system of government, to require the
[defendant] to defend the particular suit which is brought there." Id. at 317.
17. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.,
355 U.S. 220 (1957); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952);
Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
18. E.g., Kurland, supra note 10, at 593-624; Seidelson, Jurisdiction Over NonResident Defendants: Beyond "Minimum Contacts" and the Long-Arm Statutes, 6
DUQ. U.L. REV. 221, 225-37 (1968); Comment, Long-Arm and Quasi in Rem
Jurisdiction and the Fundamental Test of Fairness, 69 MICH. L. REV. 300 (1970).
19. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
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between the subject matter of the litigation and the forum state, and
on a balancing of the forum's interest in providing redress with the
parties' interests in the location of the litigation. 20 In Hanson v.
Denckla,21 however, the Court drew back from McGee's expansive
implications. The Hanson Court held that "it is essential in each
case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully
avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
state, thus invoking the benefits and. protections of its laws. ' 22 The
Court stated that the restrictions on the exercise of jurisdiction were
"more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant
litigation. ' 23 Instead, limitations on jurisdiction were "a consequence of the territorial limitations on the power of the respective
States." 24 Apparently, the physical power concept of Pennoyer had
25
not been abandoned entirely.
Despite these theoretical inconsistencies, International Shoe,
along with its four-case progeny, have established a flexible analysis
that has proven workable in practice. As generally applied, the
analysis calls for the consideration of a number of factors, no one of
which is controlling by itself. 26 These include "the nature and

quality and the circumstances" of the defendant's acts in the
jurisdiction, 27 the quantity of the defendant's activity, 28 an "estimate
20. Id. at 223-24. See Kurland, supra note 10, at 606-10.
21. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). For an analysis of this decision, see Scott, Hanson v.
Denckla, 72 HARV. L. REV. 695 (1959).
22. 357 U.S. at 253. The Court further stated: "[T]he requirements for personal
jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff
. ..to the flexible standard of InternationalShoe Co. u. Washington.. . . But it is a
mistake to assume that this trend heralds the eventual demise of all restrictions on
the personal jurisdiction of state courts." Id. at 251 (citations omitted).
23. Id. at 251.
24. Id.
25. See Kurland, supra note 10, at 612-24; Comment, Long-Arm and Quasi In
Rem Jurisdiction and the Fundamental Test of Fairness,69 MICH. L. REV. 300, 307-09
(1970). Professor Ehrenzweig reached a similar conclusion even before Hanson was
decided. Ehrenzweig, Pennoyer is Dead - Long Live Pennoyer, 30 ROCKY MTN. L.
REV. 285 (1958). This view is clearly subject to reappraisal, however, in light of the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Shaffer v. Heitner, 45 U.S.L.W. 4849 (U.S.June 24,
1977). See note 9 supra.
Unfortunately, the Hanson decision has generated some confusion; the Court
simply failed to precisely define the restraint it imposed. See Hazard, A General
Theory of State Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 241, 243-44.
26. See generally Kurland, supra note 10, at 623. For an interesting categorization
of the potential factors, see Comment, Extending "Minimum Contacts" to Alimony:
Mizner v. Mizner, 20 HASTINGS L. J. 361, 366-67 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Extending
"Minimum Contacts'].
27. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945). See Perkins v
Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447 (1952).
28. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 448 (1952); International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318-20 (1945).
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of the inconveniences" posed by the location of the forum, 29 and the
interest of the forum in providing redress.30 In addition, the
restraining caveat of Hanson must be complied with,3 ' but it has
been variously interpreted. At the least, it probably means that the
"defendant must have taken some voluntary action calculated to
32
have an effect in the forum State."
The long arm statutes were enacted to provide legislative
authority for the exercise of the expanded jurisdiction first allowed
by International Shoe. Although there are variations in form and
scope among the statutes in different states, the basic pattern has
been to enumerate acts that give the defendant sufficient contact
with the forum to enable the state to exercise jurisdiction.
Maryland's long arm statute exemplifies the most common form:
§ 6-103.

Cause of Action Arising From Conduct In State
Or Tortious Injury Outside State.

(a) Condition. - If jurisdiction over a person is based
solely upon this section, he may be sued only on a cause of
action arising from any act enumerated in this section.
(b) In general. - A court may exercise personal jurisdiction
over a person, who directly or by an agent:
(1) Transacts any business or performs any character of
work or service in the state;
(2) Contracts to supply goods, food, services, or manufactured products in the state;
(3) Causes tortious injury in the state by an act or omission
in the state;
(4) Causes tortious injury in the state or outside of the state
by an act or omission outside the state if he regularly does or
solicits business, engages in any other persistent course of
conduct in the state or derives substantial revenue from goods,
food, services, or manufactured products used or consumed in
the state;
(5) Has an interest in, uses, or possesses real property in
the state; or
(6) Contracts to insure or acts as surety for, or on, any
person, property, risk, contract, obligation, or agreement located,
29. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945). See McGee v.
International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223-24 (1957); Travelers Health Ass'n v.
Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 648-49 (1950).

30. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957); Travelers
Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 649 (1950).
31. See text accompanying note 22 supra.

32. Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdictionin
Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533, 549.
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executed, or to be performed within the state at the time the
contract is made, unless the parties otherwise provide in
writing.33
The classes of activities enumerated in the Maryland statute, such
as transacting business in the state and causing tortious injury in
the state, are traditional long arm categories.
A court will normally address two issues in determining whether
long arm jurisdiction may be exercised in a particular case.34 The
first issue is one of statutory construction: it must bo decided
whether the defendant's activities in the forum state bring him
within the scope of the statutory language. The second issue is a
constitutional one: notwithstanding the applicability of the statute,
a court must decide whether the defendant's contacts with the forum
state satisfy the minimum contacts test established by International
Shoe and its progeny. In many instances, jurisdiction has been
denied solely by resolution of the first issue. In Feathers v.
McLucas, 35 for example, the New York Court of Appeals held that
jurisdiction could not be asserted over the defendant manufacturer of
a tractor-mounted steel tank that had exploded while filled with
propane gas. The relevant long arm provision allowed jurisdiction
based upon the commission of "a tortious act within the state," 36 but
the court held that the defendant's "tortious act" was committed at
the place of manufacture, in Kansas, and therefore was not
committed "within the state." 37 The court pointedly stated that "the
question

presented

is not

.

.

. whether the Legislature could

constitutionally have enacted legislation expanding the jurisdiction
• . .[to cover this case], or whether, indeed, the Legislature should
'
have done so . . .but whether the Legislature did, in fact, do so. 38
Courts, however, have not always rigidly separated the issues of
statutory construction and due process analysis. After all, it was the
33. MD.CTS. & JUD.PROC. CODE ANN. § 6-103 (1974). The statute was enacted by
1964 Md. Laws ch. 95, and amended once by 1965 Md. Laws ch. 749. The Maryland

statute was based on the

§ 1.03,

UNIFORM INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE ACT,

9B UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 74 (Supp. 1964), which formed the model for many
state long arm statutes. For a general treatment of the significance of the Maryland
statute, see Auerbach, supra note 13.
34. See, e.g., Haynes v. James H. Carr, Inc., 427 F.2d 700, 703 (4th Cir. 1970);
Topik v. Catalyst Research Corp., 339 F. Supp. 1102, 1105-06 (D. Md. 1972); Akichika
v. Kelleher, 96 Idaho 930, 539 P.2d 283, 285 (1975).
35. 15 N.Y.2d 443, 459-60, 209 N.E.2d 68, 77, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 20-21 (1965),
consolidated on appeal sub nom. Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes &
Reinecke, Inc.
36. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAw § 302(a)2 (McKinney 1972).
37. 15 N.Y.2d at 459-63, 209 N.E.2d at 77-79, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 20-21.
38. Id. at 459-60, 209 N.E.2d at 77, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 20-21 (emphasis in original).
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expansion of constitutionally permissible jurisdiction that motivated
the passage of the long arm statutes. A number of courts have
therefore purported to equate the scope of the statute with the limits
of constitutional jurisdiction, reasoning that the statute "reflect[s] a
conscious purpose to assert jurisdiction over non-resident defendants
to the extent permitted by the due process clause. '3 9 The Maryland
40
Court of Appeals has indicated its approval of this view.
There are difficulties with the position that a long arm statute is
to be construed to provide jurisdiction whenever permitted by due
process. Traditional long arm statutes enumerate specific categories
of acts as prerequisites to the exercise of jurisdiction. 41 As a result,
the statutes are potentially more restrictive than the minimum
contacts analysis, which permits consideration of a variety of
independent factors. 42 This problem was directly addressed in St.
Clair v. Righter.43 The plaintiff, a Virginia resident, sued nonresident defendants for libel based on publication in Virginia of
letters that were mailed by the defendants outside of Virginia. The
relevant portions of the Virginia long arm statute (the language of
which is similar to that found in the Maryland statute) allowed
jurisdiction where the defendant had
(3) [c]aus[ed] tortious injury by an act or omission in this State;
[or]
(4) [c]aus[ed] tortious injury in this State by an act or omission
outside this State if he regularly does or solicits business, or
engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives
substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services
rendered, in this State..

.. 44

39. Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 378, 389, 143 N.E.2d 673, 679 (1957). Accord,
Hamilton Nat'l Bank v. Russell, 261 F. Supp. 145, 146-47 (E.D. Tenn. 1966) (Tenn.
statute); Safari Outfitters, Inc. v. Superior Court, 167 Colo. 456, 459, 448 P.2d 783, 784
(1968); Schneider v. Linkfield, 40 Mich. App. 131, 198 N.W.2d 834 (1972), affl'd, 389
Mich. 608, 209 N.W.2d 225 (1973); Hebron Brick Co. v. Robinson Brick & Tile Co., 234
N.W.2d 250, 255-56 (N.D. 1975); Estes Packing Co. v. Kadish & Milman Beef Co., 530
S.W.2d 622, 627 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
40. See, e.g., Krashes v. White, 275 Md. 549, 558-59, 341 A.2d 798, 803 (1975);
Harris v. Arlen Properties, 256 Md. 185, 195-96, 260 A.2d 22, 27 (1969); Gilliam v.
Moog Indus. Inc., 239 Md. 107, 111, 210 A.2d 390, 392 (1965). The Maryland cases are
discussed at notes 224 to 231 and accompanying text infra.
41. See, e.g., MD. CTS. & JUD."PROC. CODE ANN. § 6-103 (1974), quoted in full at
text accompanying note 33 supra.
42. See text accompanying notes 26 to 32 supra. Cf. Piracci v. New York City
Employee's Retirement Sys., 321 F. Supp. 1067, 1070 (D. Md. 1971) (Suggesting that
some of the "enumerated acts" in Maryland's long arm statute do not extend
jurisdiction to the outer limits of the due process clause in spite of an acknowledged
intent to extend jurisdiction to these limits); Seidelson, supra note 18, at 237.
43. 250 F. Supp. 148 (W.D. Va. 1966).
44. VA. CODE § 8-81.2(3) & (4) (Supp. 1964).
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The court carefully examined this statutory language and deter45
mined that neither category applied to the facts of the case.
Nevertheless, the court believed that jurisdiction was constitutionally warranted because Virginia had an interest in providing relief
in a situation involving so many contacts with the state, and
because the defendants had voluntarily committed an act "calculated to have an effect in the forum state. ' 46 Noting the trend
toward merger of the statutory and constitutional limits, 4 7 the court
decided that jurisdiction should be asserted. It disposed of the
restrictive effect of the statutory language by reasoning that the
statute was "merely legislative approval for the exercise by the
courts of th[is] state of their inherent jurisdictional power at least to
the limits set out in the statute. . . . [T]his does not restrict the
courts and prohibit them from extending their jurisdiction to the
limits of due process ....
Most courts would probably disagree with the analysis used in
St. Clair. A court must have legislative authority for the exercise of
jurisdiction. 49 Nevertheless, St. Clair illustrates the dilemma faced
by courts that have asserted that traditional long arm statutes are
intended to extend jurisdiction to constitutional limits, when those
courts are confronted with the specific wording of the statute. Courts
have resolved this problem in a variety of ways. Some courts have
stretched the statutory language to the constitutional limits by
imposing rather strained constructions, 50 thus effectively ignoring
the strictures of the legislative mandate. Other courts, while stating
that the long arm statute is intended to cover all cases where
jurisdiction is constitutional, nevertheless do not equate the
constitutional and statutory tests in application; these courts
continue to examine the issue of statutory construction separately. 51
Finally, there are a number of opinions which apparently do merge
45. 250 F. Supp. at 150-51.
46. Id. at 154-55 (quoting Currie, supra note 32, at 549).
47. Id. at 152.
48. Id.
49. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 7, Comment a (1942). See Beaty v.
M.S. Steel Co., 401 F.2d 157, 158-61 (4th Cir. 1968).
50. See, e.g., Schneider v. Linkfield, 40 Mich. App. 131, 198 N.W.2d 834 (1972),
aff'd, 389 Mich. 608, 209 N.W.2d 225 (1973). In Schneider, plaintiff sued in a Michigan
court for injuries sustained in an automobile accident in Indiana. The parties all
resided in Michigan at the time. The court sustained the exercise of jurisdiction based
on "[the ownership, use, or possession of any real or tangible personal property
situated within the state." MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.705(3) (1968). The court held
that, because the defendant's automobile was titled in Michigan, it was constructively
situated in Michigan at the time of the accident in Indiana. 40 Mich. App. at 134,198
N.W.2d at 836.
51. See, e.g., Estes Packing Co. v. Kadish & Millman Beef Co., 530 S.W.2d 622
(Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
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the two issues by measuring the facts solely against the minimum
contacts test.52 But the facts in this last category of cases generally
make it obvious that the statute applies, so that it might be said that
these courts have merely assumed its applicability.5 3 Thus the last
two categories of cases do not really solve the problem; courts in
these cases simply exercise jurisdiction to the constitutional limit so
long as the statute applies.
As many of the cases that will be discussed later have
recognized, the minimum contacts analysis is easy to apply in the
alimony context. 54 The vagrant spouse who has been domiciled in
the forum where the abandoned spouse seeks relief clearly has had
"minimum contacts" with the forum. Also, the state has a strong
interest in protecting the abandoned spouse and providing redress.
That interest is surely as strong as the state's interest in providing
redress for tort or contract plaintiffs. Finally, by having maintained
home and family in the forum, the vagrant spouse has certainly
"purposefully avail[ed] [himself] of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws." 55 While some weight must be given to the
inconvenience to the vagrant spouse caused by litigation in a distant
forum, the "estimate of the inconveniences" 56 may frequently be
resolved in favor of the abandoned spouse's need for convenient
relief.
The problem of identifying the proper boundaries of the
statutory language is the major difficulty confronting a court's
exercise of long arm jurisdiction in an alimony action. The Supreme
Court cases that provided the impetus for the enactment of the
statutes all involved business or fiduciary transactions. Consequently, the traditional statutes were worded to apply in a

52. See, e.g., Hamilton Nat'l Bank v. Russell, 261 F. Supp. 145 (E.D. Tenn. 1966);
Safari Outfitters, Inc. v. Superior Court, 167 Colo. 456, 448 P.2d 783 (1968); Hebron
Brick Co. v. Robinson Brick & Tile Co., 234 N.W.2d 250, 255-56 (N.D. 1975).
53. Cf. Piracci v. Employee's Retirement Sys., 321 F. Supp. 1067, 1070 (D. Md.
1971) (merging constitutional and statutory tests, but viewing the facts against both
and holding neither test satisfied).
54. See generally Anderson, Using Long-Arm Jurisdiction to Enforce Marital
Obligations, 42 Miss. L.J. 183 (1971); Long-Arm Jurisdiction,supra note 5; Extending
"Minimum Contacts," supra note 26; Comment, Domestic Relations: The Role of the
Long Arm Statutes, 10 WASHBURN L.J. 487 (1970).
55. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
56. International Shoe, Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945).
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commercial context.5 7 A reading of the Maryland statute5 8 readily
suggests that what its draftsmen had in mind were tort actions and
actions arising out of commercial activities. Alimony actions do not
fit neatly into either of these categories. For example, in Mroczynski
v. McGrath,5 9 a conservator brought an action in Illinois on behalf
of an incompetent to have his father's will set aside as against
public policy because it disinherited the incompetent son. The father
had abandoned the family in Illinois during his son's infancy and
had moved permanently to another state. The plaintiff argued that
the establishment of a marital domicile and a family constituted
"transaction of . . . business" 60 in Illinois. But the court denied

jurisdiction, finding it obvious that "such acts do not constitute the
'transaction of business' within the meaning of this statute, as the
words commonly used and understood mean business in the
commercial aspect."'6 1 The court also rejected the claim that the
'6 2
father's abandonment of his family constituted a "tortious act."
Several states have resolved this problem by legislation that
specifically provides for long arm jurisdiction in certain domestic
relations cases.63 For example, the New York legislature added the
following provision to that state's long arm statute in 1974:
A court in any matrimonial action or family court proceeding
...may exercise personal jurisdiction over the respondent or
defendant notwithstanding the fact that he or she no longer is a
resident or domiciliary of this state, or over his or her executor or
administrator, if the party seeking support is a resident of or
57. It has become well-established since these Supreme Court cases that the
minimum contacts analysis applies to individual as well as corporate defendants.
Rosenblatt v. American Cyanamid Co., 86 S. Ct. 1 (Goldberg, Circuit Justice, 1965);
J.W. Sparks & Co. v. Gallos, 47 N.J. 295, 220 A.2d 673 (1966). See generally Smithers,
Virginia's "Long Arm" Statute: An Argument for Constitutionalityof Jurisdiction
Over Nonresident Individuals, 51 VA. L. REV. 712 (1965).
58. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 6-103 (1974). See text accompanying note
33 supra.
59. 34 Ill. 2d 451, 216 N.E.2d 137 (1966).
60. Civil Practice Act, § 17(1)(a), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17(1)(a) (Smith-Hurd
1968).
61. 34 Ill. 2d at 454, 216 N.E.2d at 139.
62. Civil Practice Act, § 17(1)(b), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17(1)(b) (Smith-Hurd
1968). For further discussion of the tort theory of long arm jurisdiction, see text
accompanying notes 210 to 223 infra.
63. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-514(e) (1976 Supp.); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17(1)(e)
(Smith-Hurd 1968); IND. CODE ANN. Trial Rule 4.4 (Burns 1976); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-308(b)(8) (1976); NEV. REV. STAT. § 14.065(2)(e) (1973); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 21-3-16
A(5) (1975 Supp.); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 302(b) (McKinney Supp. 1976); OHIO REV.
CODE Civil Rules tit. II, rule 4.3(A)(8) (Page 1971); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 1701.03(a)(7) (West 1976 Supp.); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 247.057 (West 1977 Supp.).

1977]

THE ABANDONED SPOUSE

domiciled in this state at the time such demand is made,
provided that this state was the matrimonial domicile of the
parties before their separation, or the defendant abandoned the
plaintiff in this state, or the obligation to pay support or alimony
accrued under the laws
of this state or under an agreement
64
executed in this state.
Those courts that have considered the question have found these
65
statutes to be constitutional.
The cases that follow shed some light on the question whether
long arm jurisdiction may be asserted in the alimony and support
contexts, in the absence of specific legislation.
THE SEPARATION AGREEMENT CASES

Willis v. Willis 66 was the first reported case to consider the

applicability of long arm jurisdiction to an action on a separation
agreement. 67 The plaintiff wife sued in New York to have a
separation agreement enforced. The defendant husband was
domiciled outside New York when the agreement was executed, 68
and he continued to be domiciled outside the state at the time of suit.
Additionally, the defendant maintained no business in New York.
The plaintiff argued that the act of executing the separation
agreement in New York brought the defendant within the terms of
the New York long arm statute, which conferred jurisdiction over a
person who "transact[ed] any business within the state." 69 The court
granted the defendant's motion to vacate the summons and
complaint, holding that it had no jurisdiction. 70 The court went no
further than to hold that the statute applied only to transactions
with a "commercial aspect, '' 71 involving "business" in that sense.
64. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAw § 302(b) (McKinney Supp. 1976).
65. E.g., Scott v. Hall, 203 Kan. 331, 454 P.2d 449 (1969); Dillon v. Dillon, 46 Wis.
2d 659, 176 N.W.2d 362 (1970). See generally Anderson, supra note 54; Friedman,
Extension of the Illinois Long Arm Statute: Divorce & Separate Maintenance,16 DE
PAUL L. REV. 45 (1966); Note, In Personam Jurisdiction Expanded: Utah's Long Arm

Statute, 1970

UTAH

L.

REV.

222.

66. 42 Misc. 2d 473, 248 N.Y.S.2d 260 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
67. Cockrum v. Cockrum, 20 App. Div. 2d 642, 246 N.Y.S.2d 376 (1964), decided a
few days before Willis, reversed a trial court's alimony order for want of proper
jurisdiction. The court apparently believed that domicile was the only relevant basis
for jurisdiction.
68. 42 Misc. 2d at 474, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 261.
69. N.Y. CiV. PRAC. LAW §302 (McKinney 1972) (amended 1974 N.Y. Laws ch.
859, § 1, to specifically cover action for support).
70. 42 Misc. 2d at 474-75, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 261-62. Accord, Durgom v. Durgom, 47
Misc. 2d 513, 262 N.Y.S.2d 874 (Civ. Ct. 1965).
71. 42 Misc. 2d at 475, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 262.
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Having found the statute inapplicable, the court did not reach the
constitutional issue.
The restrictive rule established by Willis was short-lived, two
decisions from other jurisdictions contributing to its demise. In Spitz
v. Spitz, 72 the parties had lived together in New York and had

executed a separation agreement there, after which the husband
moved to Massachusetts. The plaintiff wife obtained a judgment on
the agreement in New York, and she brought an action on the New
York judgment in Massachusetts. The Massachusetts court held that
the New York court had properly exercised long arm jurisdiction
over the husband. 73 The court did not consider the construction of
the New York statute rendered in Willis to be binding. But the court
did more than merely construe "transacting business" differently.
Instead, the court took a broad view of the husband's activities,
stating that the separation agreement was a "mere incident in a
complex domestic situation which involves the responsibility of the
defendant as the head of a family, over a long period of time. ' 74 The
court continued:
Whether an arrangement whereby one lives apart from his wife
and family and leaves the state of their residence can be
designated "doing business" is beside the point. The expression
is not a term of art. . .. What does matter is that a course of

action inextricably involved in the status and legal responsibilities of the defendant is going on in the state of New York. The
jurisdiction of the courts of New York over such a situation is by
no means casual. The State of New York can, if it so desires,
invoke criminal sanctions to enforce the claims of this plaintiff
on the defendant. There is a strong social interest in the security
75
of family life.

The Maryland Court of Appeals also had occasion to examine
Willis in Van Wagenberg v. Van Wagenberg.76 Mr. and Mrs. Van
Wagenberg had lived together in Maryland. When they separated,
the wife moved to New York, where the parties executed a separation
agreement. Some years later, Mrs. Van Wagenberg obtained a New
72. 31 Mass. App. Dec. 124 (Boston Mun. Ct. 1965).
73. Id. at 129-30. The husband attacked the validity of the New York judgment
on the ground that the New York court lacked jurisdiction over him. In an action on a
judgment of a foreign state, the jurisdiction of the foreign court is subject to attack,
and the forum court need not give full.faith and credit to the first judgment if it finds
jurisdiction to have been unsound. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
74. 31 Mass. App. Dec. at 129.
75. Id. at 129-30.
76. 241 Md. 154, 215 A.2d 812 (1966).
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York judgment against her husband for payments due on the
separation agreement, and subsequently filed suit on the New York
judgment in Maryland. The Maryland Court of Appeals held that
the New York judgment was grounded on proper long arm jurisdic77
tion.
The Maryland court based its decision on its reading of
Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc.,78 a major
decision of the New York Court of Appeals. The Maryland court read
Longines as establishing that the acts involved need not be
"commercial" in the strict sense.7

9

The court noted that although a

separation agreement was not a transaction for profit in the
marketplace, it was nevertheless "a legal act of the most serious
nature" that "sounds in contract" and "deals with matters
commonly associated with business."' The court concluded that
"[o]ur study of the Longines decisions persuades us that it is the
doing of an act -

with the necessary contact in the state - which is

determinative, and that the legislative history and the plain
meaning of the statute show that it includes within its reach acts
such as are here involved."8' The court concluded that Willis should
82
not be followed.
Spitz and Van Wagenberg set the stage for the abandonment of
the Willis rule in subsequent New York decisions. A line of New York
cases has established a clear rule that the execution of a separation
agreement constitutes the transaction of business within the
meaning of the statute. The first case expressly so to hold and to
disapprove Willis was Kochenthal v. Kochenthal.83 Once again, the
issue was whether a trial court had properly exercised long arm
jurisdiction over a non-resident husband in a suit for arrears due on
a separation agreement that was executed in New York. The court
cited with approval Spitz v. Spitz,8 4 and Van Wagenberg v. Van

Wagenberg, quoting at length from the Maryland court's discussion
of the commercial nature of a separation agreement.85 But the
77. Id. at 172-76, 215 A.2d at 822-24.
78. 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965).
79. 241 Md. at 166, 169-70, 215 A.2d at 818, 820-21.
80. Id. at 167-68, 215 A.2d at 819.
81. Id. at 170, 215 A.2d at 821.
82. Id. at 171-72, 215 A.2d at 821-22.
83. 28 App. Div. 2d 117, 282 N.Y.S.2d 36 (1967). Before Kochenthal, one New York
case had disapproved Willis in dicta, Raschitore v. Fountain, 52 Misc. 2d 402, 404, 275
N.Y.S.2d 709, 711 (1966), and one case had implicitly disapproved Willis, Todd v.
Todd, 51 Misc. 2d 94, 272 N.Y.S.2d 455 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
84. 28 App. Div. 2d at 118-19, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 38 (quoting 31 Mass. App. Dec. 124
(Boston Mun. Ct. 1965)). See text accompanying notes 73 to 75 supra.
85. 28 App. Div. 2d at 119, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 39 (quoting 241 Md. at 167-68, 215
A.2d at 819-20).
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Kochenthal court also read the term "business" broadly, quoting
extensively from the lower court's opinion:
I do not hold to the belief that the statute in question must be so
narrowly construed as to be applicable only to pecuniary
transactions of a commercial nature. . . The term "business"
should not necessarily be limited to commerce among the states
and thus be applicable only to people and corporations engaged
in pecuniary gain. I know of no concept of contract law which
would exclude agreements between husband and wife in such a
manner as to draw a mantle of protection over either the
husband or the wife in the event that one of them becomes a
resident of another state and proceeds to violate a written
86
instrument duly made and executed between them.
The court concluded that the minimum contacts test would also
support its holding.8 7 Kochenthal has been followed by numerous
cases, most of which have held that jurisdiction should be exer8
cised.
The cases discussed above are not entirely consistent in their
reasoning. In its simplest form, the question facing these courts was
one of statutory construction: does the act of executing a separation
agreement make the defendant one who has "transact[ed] any
business within this state, '8 9 within the meaning of the statute? If
read narrowly, Van Wagenberg and Kochenthal were decided simply
by answering this question in the affirmative, reasoning that a
separation agreement has enough legal and financial consequences
to bring it within the concept of "transacting business." 9 On the
86. 28 App. Div. at 120, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 39-40 (quoting Kochenthal v. Kochenthal,
52 Misc. 2d 437, 441, 442-43, 275 N.Y.S.2d 951, 954 (Sup. Ct. 1966)).
87. 28 App. Div. at 120-21, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 40 (quoting 52 Misc. 2d at 442-43, 275
N.Y.S.2d at 956).
88. See, e.g., Zindwer v. Ehrens, 34 App. Div. 2d 906, 311 N.Y.S.2d 389 (Sup. Ct.
1970); Kassuto v. Yalon, 77 Misc. 2d 132, 353 N.Y.S.2d 291 (Sup. Ct. 1974); Lawrenz v.
Lawrenz, 65 Misc. 2d 627, 318 N.Y.S.2d 610 (Fam. Ct. 1971).
However, in Whitaker v. Whitaker, 56 Misc. 2d 625, 289 N.Y.S.2d 465 (Sup. Ct.
1968), the court refused to exercise long arm jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary
husband in an alimony action by the abandoned wife. The court held that the "weight
of authority" seemed to be that the execution of a separation agreement did not confer
long arm jurisdiction. Id. at 626, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 466. This observation is clearly
erroneous. First, Kochenthal had already been decided by a higher court; the
Whitaker court was apparently unaware of Kochenthal. Second, in addition to Willis,
the court cited Raschitore v. Fountain, 52 Misc. 2d 402, 275 N.Y.S.2d 709 (Sup. Ct.
1966). While declining to reach the jurisdictional issue, the Raschitore court
disapproved Willis in dictum, so that the Whitaker court apparently misread
Raschitore.
89. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAw § 302(a)(1) (McKinney 1972).
90. See Van Wagenberg v. Van Wagenberg, 241 Md. 154, 166-72, 215 A.2d 812,
818-22 (1966); Kochenthal v. Kochenthal, 28 App. Div. 2d 117, 121, 282 N.Y.S.2d 36, 41
(Sup. Ct. 1967) (concurring opinion).
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other hand, the court in Spitz stated that whether or not a particular
transaction "[could]. be designated 'doing business' is beside the
point."91 Spitz upheld jurisdiction because there was "a course of

action inextricably involved in the status and legal responsibilities
of the defendant" 92 occurring in the forum state. The court viewed
the specific categories of contacts named in the statute as mere
guidelines, designed to be construed liberally so as to permit the
broadest permissible extension of jurisdiction.
Under either theory, there are strong arguments that the
resulting "Kochenthal rule" is correct. It is, of course, arguable that
a separation agreement is merely a settlement of personal affairs
and is therefore not within the contemplation of the statute. It has
been held by some courts that the acts of establishing and
maintaining a family relationship are not "business. '93 But the
actual nature of a separation agreement suggests a contrary
conclusion. The similarities between a separation agreement and a
business contract were articulated by a commentator on the New
York long arm statute:
[T]here are enough "commercial" earmarks on the usual
separation agreement to qualify as a transaction of business.
Extensive provisions are normally made for the division of
property, complicated tax structures are often erected, and in
many cases escrow funds are created, with banks acting as
escrowees. The numerous preliminary negotiations . .

.

. the

complex financial arrangements and the hard headed bargaining of the market place all attest to the commercial nature of the
agreement. 94
A valid separation agreement is generally a legal contract that must
be supported by consideration. 95 The agreement often attempts to
96
establish a final settlement of the property rights of the spouses.
But the agreement itself does not affect the marital status; indeed,
97
an agreement may be held void if it facilitates a divorce directly.
Therefore, its purpose is necessarily limited to defining the
91. Spitz v. Spitz, 31 Mass.
added).
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., Mroczynski v.
94. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw
Practice Commentaries 302:15).
95. 1 W. NELSON, DIVORCE
1945).
96. Id. at § 13.39.
97. Id. at § 13.22.

App. Dec. 124, 129 (Boston Mun. Ct. 1965) (emphasis
McGrath, 34 I1. 2d 451, 216 N.E.2d 137 (1966).
§302 commentary (McKinney 1972) (McLaughlin,
& ANNULMENT § 13.05 & 13.20 (2d ed. J. Henderson
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obligations of the parties. 98 Thus it is an arm's length transaction
between two persons who are already estranged, and it deals with
matters that are carefully considered.
If the constitutional analysis is applied, the argument for
exercising jurisdiction is equally strong. Marital duties exist under
the law of the forum state by virtue of the marriage. "Certainly, the
existence of a marital domicile in a state has as many consequences
as 'economic activity' does." 99
THE BROAD LONG ARM STATUTES

By executing a separation agreement in the forum, the
defendant provides a court with a convenient focal point for
application of long arm jurisdiction. In the absence of a separation
agreement, it becomes more difficult to identify contacts with the
forum that fit the language of the traditional long arm categories. If
the spouses have maintained their marital domicile in the forum, the
defendant clearly has had considerable contact with that state. But
unless there is a separation agreement, the abandoned spouse's
action for support or alimony does not arise out of a contract, nor
does it arise out of specific acts that provide the "overtone of
commercial necessity" 1°° of the traditional long arm language.
Nevertheless, a number of courts have exercised long arm jurisdiction in support or alimony actions where there was no separation
agreement. This section will discuss the cases that did so by
applying broadly worded long arm statutes.
The parties in Soule v. Soule10 1 lived together in California,
where the wife brought an action for divorce and alimony. Before
she commenced the action, the husband moved to Montana, where
he was served with process. The California long arm statute
provided for personal jurisdiction if the defendant "was a resident of
this State (a) at the time of the commencement of the action, or (b) at
the time that the cause of action arose, or (c) at the time of
service. 1 0 2 A California appellate court affirmed the exercise of
jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant under this statute.
Because the defendant was a resident of California1 0 3 when the
cause of action arose, the court had no difficulty in holding that the
98. See Id.
99. Long-Arm Jurisdiction, supra note 4, at 296.
100. Anderson, Using Long-Arm Jurisdiction To Enforce Marital Obligations, 42
Miss. L.J. 183, 188 (1971).
101. 193 Cal. App. 2d 443, 14 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 985 (1962).
102. 1951 Cal. Stat. ch. 935 § 1, as amended by 1957 Cal. Stat. ch. 1674 (current
version at CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (1977)).
103. 193 Cal. App. 2d at 445, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 418.
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statute applied.10 4 Thus, in contrast to the separation agreement
cases discussed previously, Soule was a case in which the language
of the statute clearly applied. The only real issue in Soule was
whether application of the statute was constitutional under the
105
minimun contacts concept.
The court based its holding that jurisdiction was constitutional
entirely on the precedent of Owens v. Superior Court.10 6 Owens was a
tort suit against the owner of a dog that had bitten the plaintiff; as
in Soule, the defendant had been domiciled in California when the
cause of action arose, but moved away before suit was commenced.
The Owens court's analysis of the nature of the defendant's contact
with the forum state, which was adopted by Soule, is interesting. The
defendant contended that, notwithstanding the statute, his amenability to suit based on domicile ceased when his domicile there
ended. 10 7 The Owens court agreed that "the mere fact of past
domicile in the state would not subject [the defendant] to its
jurisdiction indefinitely."1 0 8 But the court stated that the defendant's
conduct in the state, namely "ownership and possession of the
offending dog," 10 9 might subject him to jurisdiction under the
doctrine of InternationalShoe. The court rejected the argument that
these contacts were insufficient and that a non-resident individual
defendant's conduct had to be of an especially dangerous nature
before it would subject him to tort liability in the forum:11°
Even if we were to assume that an activity carried on within
the state out of which the cause of action arose must be of some
peculiarly -dangerous or serious kind to justify an assertion of
jurisdiction, no such limitation exists if the defendant was also
domiciled in the state at the time the cause of action arose.
When, as in this case, the cause of action arose here out of an
104. Id. Commentators have stated that one specific purpose behind this
California statute was to reach domestic relations cases. See generally 1 RUT.-CAM.
L.J. 117, 124 n.48 (1969).
105. 193 Cal. App. 2d at 446, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 418.
106. 52 Cal. 2d 822, 345 P.2d 921 (1959).
107. Id. at 829, 345 P.2d at 923. The defendant's argument reflected prior law.
Domicile is a clear basis for personal jurisdiction. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 464
(1940). The California statute in question was an amendment of a prior statute which
had allowed jurisdiction based on domicile. The defendant argued that the
amendment did not alter the old rule, so that the domicile must be continuing to form
a basis for jurisdiction.
108. 52 Cal. 2d at 829, 345 P.2d at 923.
109. Id. at 830, 345 P.2d at 924.
110. Id. at 832, 345 P.2d at 925. The defendant was asserting that pre-International
Shoe cases involving jurisdiction over non-resident motorists were controlling. For
further discussion of the non-resident motorist cases, see Auerbach, supra note 13, at
15-16.
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activity carried on here at a time when defendant was domiciled
here, "the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the
fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the
purpose of the due process clause to insure" (International Shoe
Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 [1945].

. .)

fully

justifies subjecting defendant to the jurisdiction of our courts.111
The court's analysis contains a strong implication that, even
though former domicile alone cannot subject a non-resident
defendant to jurisdiction indefinitely after he has moved away,
nevertheless the fact of domicile at the time of the conduct leading to
the suit is in itself a strong factor in weighing his "contacts" against
the requirements of due process. "Domicile implies a nexus between
person and place of such permanence as to control the creation of
112
legal relations and responsibilities of the utmost significance."
Soule applied this rationale to support actions against deserting
spouses. The court concluded that the fact of domicile, when
combined with the conduct that gave rise to the divorce action, was
13
sufficient to satisfy the minimum contacts test.
The Soule rule was scrutinized in Mizner v. Mizner,1 1 4 where the
Nevada Supreme Court gave full faith and credit to a California
judgment awarding alimony. The court acknowledged that none of
the Supreme Court's minimum contacts cases had involved alimony,
but stated that the minimum contacts concept was "peculiarly suited
115
to matrimonial support cases":
If such [sufficient] contacts are in fact present in the particular
case . ..then the extension of in personam jurisdiction beyond

the borders of the forum state may prove to be a sensible step
in solving some of the hardships arising from family separation. .

.

. [Sitrict application of the Pennoyer rule to family

support cases has encouraged migratory divorce by offering a
shield to a spouse wishing to avoid financial responsibility. The
state of the matrimonial domicile has a deep interest in its
citizens and a legitimate
purpose in taking steps to preclude
16
their improverishment.
111. 52 Cal. 2d at 832, 345 P.2d at 925 (emphasis added), quoted with approvalin
Soule v. Soule, 193 Cal. App. 2d 443, 446, 14 Cal. Rptr. 417, 418 (1961), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 985 (1962).
112. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945) (Frankfurter, J.).
113. 193 Cal. App. 2d at 446, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 418. Indeed, it has been argued that
"whenever one state is both the marital domicile and the forum, analysis almost
always will demonstrate sufficient 'minimum contacts' to allow the assumption of
jurisdiction [by that state]." Extending "Minimum Contacts," supra note 26, at 369.
114. 84 Nev. 268, 439 P.2d 679, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 847 (1968).
115. Id. at 270, 439 P.2d at 680.
116. Id. at 270-71, 439 P.2d at 680-81.

1977]

THE ABANDONED SPOUSE

The court approved the Soule decision, and held that jurisdiction had
7
been properly exercised.11
Two justices dissented," 8 arguing on several grounds that Soule
should not be followed and that the minimum contacts concept could
not be applied to alimony *cases at all. Although these opinions have
been criticized elsewhere, 1' 9 their main contentions require examination. Both dissenting justices argued that the minimum contacts
concept should not be applied because an alimony judgment is
generally modifiable by subsequent action of the awarding court.1 2°
The minimum contacts concept was developed in the context of tort
and contract suits; a tort or contract judgment is final. But if a court
has obtained in personam jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit for
alimony, "it conceivably will have continuing personal jurisdiction
over him to modify the alimony award for the rest of his life. ' 121
Because of this added burden on the defendant, the dissenters
contended that the requirements of substantive due process developed in tort and contract cases could not be the same in alimony
cases.
Although it is true that amenability to suit for modification may
be burdensome on a non-resident spouse, it is by no means clear that
this burden justifies a different substantive due process standard
(e.g., physical power). The absent spouse is afforded some protection
from real unfairness by the law governing modification.122 Modifica-

tion is not automatic. The spouse seeking modification must show
some genuine change in the circumstances of at least one of the
parties in order to justify the modification.1 23 Only events which
have occurred subsequent to the last decree may be considered. 124
Therefore, the moving party in a modification action can only
succeed if there is a change in one spouse's financial situation

117. Id. at 272, 439 P.2d at 681-82.
118. Id. at 273, 439 P.2d at 682 (Collins, J., dissenting); id. at 275, 439 P.2d at 684
(Batjer, J., dissenting).
119. Extending "Minimum Contacts," supra note 26, at 372 & nn.93 & 94; 1 RUT.CAM. L.J. 117, 121-23 (1969); Comment, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction to Award
Alimony, 1969 WASH. U.L.Q. 98, 103-04 [hereinafter cited as Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction].
120. 84 Nev. at 275, 277-78, 439 P.2d at 683, 685-86.
121. Id. at 275, 439 P.2d at 683.
122. See generally Extending "Minimum Contacts," supra note 26, at 372-75.
123. Lott v. Lott, 17 Md. App. 440, 302 A.2d 666 (1973); H. CLARK, supra note 2, at
456. See Winkel v. Winkel, 178 Md. 489, 15 A.2d 914 (1940).
124. H. CLARK, supra note 2, at 456-57. See Stansbury v. Stansbury, 223 Md. 475,
477, 164 A.2d 877, 878 (1960).
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warranting court action. In addition, the right of modification is
125
available to both parties.

A more fundamental question is whether the departure of a
spouse should lessen his or her obligations to the former spouse. If
the obligor spouse moved away after the divorce and alimony decree,
he or she would clearly be subject to the court's continuing
jurisdiction. 126 The dissenters in Mizner would require a different
result merely because the obligor spouse moved away before the suit
was filed, even though the burden on him or her would be the same
in either case. But even if the indeterminateness of an alimony
decree is recognized it does not follow that the minimum contacts
concept is entirely inapplicable to alimony proceedings. The
"estimate of the inconveniences"' 127 to the parties is only one of the
factors a court considers in determining whether to exercise
jurisdiction. The burden placed on the defendant by continuing
jurisdiction suggests only that the balance among the factors is
different in alimony cases and tort and contract cases. The question
then becomes whether "the burdens placed upon the absent spouse
[are] sufficiently weighty that 'traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice' require that he be able to abdicate his responsibility to his wife and children. . . . It would not seem so. '' 128
The dissenting justices in Mizner argued that the Supreme
Court's decisions in Estin v. Estin129 and May v. Anderson'3°
supported the contention that minimum contacts jurisdiction has no
place in alimony cases.13 In Estin, a wife brought suit in New York,
the former marital domicile, for arrearages in alimony payments.
The defendant husband appeared and asserted a prior Nevada
divorce decree.132 The husband argued that the Nevada decree was
125. H. CLARK, supra note 2, at 460. Maryland courts, however, deal strictly with
petitions for reduction of alimony. See, e.g., Bracone v. Bracone, 16 Md. App. 288, 295
A.2d 798 (1972).
126. 1 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 117, 120 (1969).
127. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945).
128. Extending "'Minimum Contacts," supra note 26, at 374-75 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 316).
129. 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
130. 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
131. 84 Nev. 268, 273-79, 439 P.2d 679, 682-86.
132. Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 542, 542-43 (1948). The parties had lived together in
New York. Upon their separation, the wife had obtained a decree of separation and
alimony in a New York proceeding in which the husband participated. The husband
subsequently moved to Nevada, where he obtained an absolute divorce. The wife was
served in the Nevada proceeding by constructive service, but she did not participate,
so that the Nevada decree was entirely ex parte. The Nevada decree made no mention
of alimony. After he received the Nevada divorce, the husband stopped paying
alimony; this prompted the wife's action for arrearages. Id.
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entitled to full faith and credit in New York, and that it had the
effect of extinguishing his obligation to pay alimony. 133 The
Supreme Court sustained a judgment for the wife, holding that the
Nevada decree was not entitled to full faith and credit on the issue of
the wife's right to alimony. 13 4 Although the divorce was valid, the
Nevada court could not have cut off the wife's alimony right without
in personam jurisdiction over her. 135 The Court acknowledged that
this ruling made the Nevada divorce decree "divisible," by giving
"effect to the Nevada decree insofar as it affects marital status and
to make it ineffective on the issue of alimony.'

136

In Estin, then, the Supreme Court ruled that an ex parte divorce
decree granted to a husband in the first forum (Nevada) could not be
asserted by the husband to extinguish his former wife's right to
alimony in the second forum (New York), by way of full faith and
credit. The dissenting justices in Mizner concluded that the Estin
rule applied in Mizner, where the first forum (California) granted the
wife divorce and alimony in an ex parte proceeding, and the wife
asserted that judgment to establish her right to alimony in the
second forum (Nevada) by way of full faith and credit.' 37 There is
language in Estin which, taken out of context, might support that
conclusion.' 38 The broad issue in both cases was whether the first
133. Id. at 543.
134. Id. at 549.
135. Id. at 546-49. The Nevada court's jurisdiction to grant the husband a divorce
was based on the husband's domicile in Nevada. The Supreme Court approved the
traditional rule that domicile of one spouse in a state gives that state jurisdiction to
grant a divorce. Therefore, the Nevada divorce decree validly terminated the marital
status. Id. at 546-47. The New York court did not challenge the fact of the husband's
domicile. See generally Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
It is not clear that the Nevada court did in fact purport to terminate the wife's
right to alimony. That court was informed of the wife's prior New York alimony
decree. 334 U.S. at 543. However, the Nevada court may simply not have ruled on the
issue at all. Id. at 551 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). However, in the New York
proceeding, the husband asserted that the divorce effectively extinguished alimony
rights. Therefore, the Supreme Court faced the issue whether the Nevada decree could
possibly have that effect. Id. at 547.
The Nevada court had no basis on which to assert personal jurisdiction over
the wife. Because the wife's right to alimony was a personal right, the Supreme Court
held that the Nevada court could not terminate it without personal jurisdiction over
the wife. Id. at 547-49. But the Nevada court never asserted that it did have such
jurisdiction.
In Estin, the wife's right to alimony was established before the Nevada
proceeding by a New York decree. The Supreme Court has subsequently held that the
Estin rule applies even if the wife has no alimony decree prior to the ex parte divorce.
Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957).
136. 334 U.S. at 549.
137. Mizner v. Mizner, 84 Nev. 268, 273-75, 276, 439 P.2d 679, 682-83, 684 (1968)
(Collins & Batjer, J.J., dissenting).
138. Id., 439 P.2d at 683, 684.
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forum had proper jurisdiction over the defendant, so as to require
that full faith and credit be accorded to that judgment in the second
forum. However, when placed in context, the two cases are not
parallel. In Estin, the first forum had no basis for asserting personal
jurisdiction over the defendant wife. The wife had not been served
with process in Nevada, nor had she appeared and consented to
jurisdiction there. 139 She had no contact at all with Nevada; it is not
stated that she had ever been there. The Supreme Court could never
have reached the issue of minimum contacts jurisdiction in Estin;
the issue was not present. Furthermore, the Nevada court did not
assert personal jurisdiction over the wife; the court merely granted
140
the husband a divorce on the basis of his Nevada domicile.
Therefore, the Supreme Court did not hold that Nevada had
improperly asserted personal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court merely
held that the Nevada action could not have cut off alimony rights
without personal jurisdiction. The Court had no occasion to rule on
what would have been a proper basis for such jurisdiction.' 4 ' In
contrast, the first forum in Mizner (California) had an arguable
basis for jurisdiction because the defendant husband maintained his
marital domicile there for eighteen years and had done acts there
that gave rise to the wife's right to divorce and alimony. 14 2 The court
of the first forum did assert personal jurisdiction based on the
California long arm statute, and on that basis held the defendant
liable for alimony. The issue before the court of the second forum in
Mizner (Nevada) was whether that jurisdiction was properly
exercised. Because the Supreme Court did not reach that issue in
Estin, that case was not controlling in Mizner.
Furthermore, different fact patterns often yield different rules of
jurisdiction. In Estin, the issue was the power of the first forum to
cut off the defendant's alimony rights. In Mizner, the issue was the
power of the first forum to grant alimony against the defendant.
This difference itself may be enough to distinguish the two cases.
There are similar problems with the dissenting justices' reliance
on May v. Anderson.1 43 In May, the parties maintained their marital
domicile in Wisconsin. Marital troubles arose, and the wife moved
with her children to Ohio. The husband then obtained an ex parte
139. 334 U.S. at 543, 544.
140. Id. at 543-44.
141. See note 135 and accompanying text supra.
142. Mizner v. Mizner, 84 Nev. 268, 269-70, 439 P.2d 679, 679-80 (1968).
143. 345 U.S. 528 (1953). The dissenting justices also cited New York ex rel. Halvey
v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947). Halvey was a predecessor case to May on the subject of
jurisdiction to grant custody rights. Halvey is not dispositive in Mizner for the same
reasons that May is not.
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decree in Wisconsin granting him divorce and custody. The wife was
served personally in Ohio, but, as the Supreme Court noted, the
Wisconsin statute authorized out of state service only for divorce
actions, making no mention of custody proceedings. 14 4 After the wife
had refused to surrender custody of the children to the husband, he
filed a habeas corpus proceeding in Ohio, relying on the Wisconsin
custody award. The Supreme Court held that the Wisconsin decree
was not entitled to full faith and credit in the Ohio proceeding
because the Wisconsin court had no power to cut off the wife's right
to custody of her children without in personam jurisdiction over
her. 145 The Court invoked the "divisibility" theory of Estin,146 and

held that the wife's right to custody was "a personal right entitled to
at least as much protection as her right to alimony."' 147 Thus the
Court ruled that an ex parte decree of custody in favor of the
husband, granted by a court of the first forum (Wisconsin), could not
be asserted by the husband to cut off the wife's right to custody in
the second forum (Ohio) by way of full faith and credit. The analogy
between May and Mizner is stronger than the analogy between
Estin and Mizner. In both May and Mizner, the first forum was the
marital domicile, and therefore the court of the first forum had an
arguable basis for long arm jurisdiction over the defendant spouse.
But again, it is clear that May does not dispose of the issue presented
in Mizner. In May, there was no statute that purported to grant
personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse in child custody cases.
The statute relied on allowed out of state service solely for divorce
cases. 148 Jurisdiction to grant divorce is theoretically different from
jurisdiction to determine personal rights. The Supreme Court ruled
only that divorce jurisdiction, which is based on domicile, does not
give a court the power to cut off custody rights. The Supreme Court
in May had no occasion to consider whether the wife's past contacts
with the first forum (Wisconsin) could form a proper basis for
personal jurisdiction under the minimum contacts theory.4 9 Differences between the nature of the rights affected in May and Mizner
suggest that different jurisdictional standards may be appropriate.
144. 345 U.S. at 530-31 & n.3 (1953).
145. Id. at 533-35.
146. Id. at 533-34 & n.6 (discussing Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 549 (1948)). See
text accompanying notes 135 & 136 supra.
147. 345 U.S. at 534.
148. See note 144 and accompanying text supra.
149. See Mizner v. Mizner, 84 Nev. 268, 271, 439 P.2d 679, 681 (1968). Accord,
Mitchim v. Mitchim, 518 S.W.2d 362, 365 (Tex. 1975). See People ex rel. Loeser v.
Loeser, 51 Ill.
2d 567, 283 N.E.2d 884 (1972) (jurisdiction of the first forum based on a
long arm statute held sufficient on facts substantially identical to those in May); 1
RUT.-CAM. L.J. 117, 122 (1969).
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The Supreme Court recognized that child custody involves "[r]ights
far more precious .. . than property rights ....
150 The state's
strong interest in protecting the welfare of children also supports the
conclusion that the jurisdictional rules regarding custody established in May are not dispositive of cases involving alimony.151
Jurisdiction in Soule 52 and Mizner 53 was based on the
California long arm statute 5 4 which, if read literally, is easily
applicable to alimony actions. The Soule court and the Mizner
majority held that its application to the alimony action presented
was constitutional. In Hines v. Clendenning,155 the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma dealt with an even broader statute. A defendant husband
was personally served in Louisiana in an Oklahoma action for
divorce and alimony. The husband challenged the Oklahoma court's
long arm jurisdiction over him. The section of the Oklahoma long
arm statute in question allowed jurisdiction
as to a cause of action . . .arising from the person's:
(7) maintaining any other relation to this state or to persons or
property . . .which affords a basis for the exercise of personal
jurisdiction by this state consistently with the Constitution of
5 6
the United States.1
Thus the issues of statutory construction and constitutionality were
merged completely. The court was faced directly with the issue of
how the minimum contacts test should be applied in an alimony
action.
The parties in Hines had been married in Oklahoma and
appeared to consider the state their home, but they moved about
frequently during the period of their marriage. 57 Nevertheless, the
150. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1963). See 1 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 117, 122
(1969); ExtraterritorialJurisdiction,supra note 119, at 103-04.
151. 345 U.S. at 536 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (recognition of the uniqueness of
legal rules regarding child custody).
152. 193 Cal. App. 2d 443, 14 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 985 (1962).
See text accompanying notes 101 to 113 supra.
153. 84 NEV. 268, 439 P.2d 679 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 847 (1968). See text
accompanying notes 114 to 119 supra.
154. 1951 Cal. Stat. ch. 935 § 1, as amended by 1957 Cal. Stat. ch. 1674 (current
version at CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (1977)). See text accompanying note 102
supra.
155. 465 P.2d 460 (Okla. 1970), noted in 10 WASHBURN L.J. 487 (1971).

156.

OKLA. STAT. ANN.

tit.

12, § 1701.03 (West Supp. 1976-77). For a similar

statutory provision, see CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (1977).
157. 465 P.2d at 461-62. After their marriage in Oklahoma, the parties lived there
for a year and a half. They then moved away for four years while the husband
attended medical school. They returned to Oklahoma for a year, during which time
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court found that the defendant had sufficient contacts with
Oklahoma to satisfy due process standards, and jurisdiction was
sustained. 158 The court's analysis demonstrates that the imprecision
created by the major Supreme Court cases 159 makes it difficult to
determine the exact basis for jurisdiction in alimony cases. The court
emphasized that the broad "interest analysis" approach of McGee v.
InternationalLife Insurance Co.' 6° strongly favored the exercise of
jurisdiction:
[I]t might reasonably be said that the husband helped [his wife]
select the forum where, as a matter of economic necessity, she
would have to live and bring her action for relief.
The "manifest interest" of the State of Oklahoma in the marital
status, and financial relief incident thereto, of its residents, is
surely as great as the interest of California in providing effective
insurance policy beneficiaries residing within its
redress for
61
borders.'
The court also stressed the "estimate of the inconveniences,"
noting that, although the litigation placed a burden on the nonresident husband, the alternative would be to leave the wife with no
162
remedy because she could not afford to litigate elsewhere.
However, the court felt compelled to retreat from the suggestion that
these considerations alone could justify jurisdiction. As if mindful of
the restraining caveat of Hanson v. Denckla, 63 the court cautioned

the husband registered to vote. They then went to California, where the husband was
stationed in the Air Force. The husband continued to vote in Oklahoma. After two
years, the wife returned alone to Oklahoma, where she filed her action. Id.
158. Id. at 463-64. The court listed the "contacts" it found relevant:
(1) the marriage was contracted in Oklahoma; (2) the parties twice resided
there under circumstances strongly indicating domicile; (3) defendant Hines
attended college here, obtained a license to practice medicine here, registered
to vote and did vote here; (4) he sent his wife back to Oklahoma, her home
state and the state of her parents, and refused to permit her to return to him in
California; (5) the wife, at her husband's direction, was effectively abandoned
in Oklahoma and her right, if any, to alimony, may be said to have accrued at
least in part in Oklahoma.
Id. at 463.
159. See text accompanying notes 129 to 151 supra.
160. 355 U.S. 220 (1957). See text accompanying notes 19-20 supra.
161. 465 P.2d at 463. The reference to insurance beneficiaries is a comparison to
the facts of McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
162. 465 P.2d at 463.
163. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). See text accompanying notes 21 to 25 supra.
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that the basis for its holding was largely the nature of the husband's
164
overt contact with the state.
In Mitchim v. Mitchim,16 5 the Texas Supreme Court gave full
faith and credit to an Arizona alimony judgment based on the
Arizona long arm statute. The statute allowed jurisdiction "[w]hen
the defendant is a . . .person . . .[who] has caused an event to

occur in this state out of which the claim which is the subject of the
complaint arose ....16 The Texas court held the statute applicable
to alimony actions, noting that "[i]n other states long-arm statutes
containing only general language have been held to confer personal
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants in divorce actions," and
that "the courts of Arizona make no distinction between domestic
relations cases and other types of suits."'1 67 The court approved the

reasoning in Mizner v. Mizner, 6 8 that the state of the marital
domicile had a strong interest in providing relief to abandoned
spouses, so that the minimum contacts test was well suited to
alimony actions. 169 Addressing the issue of the inconvenience to the
defendant, the court stated that "[i]n view of his prior residence [in
Arizona], he might have suffered less inconvenience and expense in
defending the suit in Arizona than [his wife] would have in
prosecuting her suit in Texas."' 70 The court considered it important
that "relevant evidence may have been more readily available"' 17 in
164. 465 P.2d at 463-64. Recently, the Supreme Court of California, applying a
long arm statute worded similarly to Oklahoma's, upheld personal jurisdiction in a
child support setting. In Kulko v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 514, 564 P.2d 353, 138 Cal.
Rptr. 586 (1977) (en banc), personal jurisdiction was exercised over a New York
domiciled ex-husband in an action for increased child support payments. Prior to their
divorce, granted by the Republic of Haiti, the Kulkos had lived in New York, where a
separation agreement was executed. By the terms of this agreement, the couple's two
children were to remain with the defendant in New York during the school year, and
with the plaintiff in California during vacation periods. When one child informed the
defendant that she wished to live permanently with her mother in California, the
defendant provided that child with a one-way airplane ticket. The Supreme Court of
California stated that the New York husband, by sending the child to California to
live permanently with her mother, had "purposely availed himself of the full
protection and benefit of California laws for the care and protection of [the child] on a
permanent basis." Id. at 524, 564 P.2d at 358, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 591. The court upheld
jurisdiction on the strength of the California long arm statute, CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE
§ 410.10 (1977), which allows for the exercise of personal jurisdiction "on any basis not
inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States."
165. 518 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. 1975).
166. 16 ARIz. REV. STAT., Rule Civ. Proc. 4(e)(2) (1961).
167. 518 S.W.2d at 365; accord, Nickerson v. Nickerson, 25 Ariz. App. 251, 542 P.2d
1131 (1975).
168. 84 NEV. 268, 439 P.2d 679 (1968). See text accompanying notes 114 to 118
supra.
169. 518 S.W.2d at 365-66.
170. Id. at 367.
171. Id.
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Arizona. As in Soule v. Soule 172 and Mizner v.Mizner,173 the court's
analysis suggests that the former marital domicile has strong
justifications for asserting long arm jurisdiction.
The cases in this section establish a judicial consensus that long
arm jurisdiction may be exercised in an alimony action against a
non-resident spouse, even if the statute does not specifically grant
jurisdiction in domestic relations cases. These courts found the
minimum contacts concept to be well suited to alimony actions,
particularly if the suit was in the former marital domicile.
THE MINIMUM CONTACTS CASES

The cases involving separation agreements 174 applied a conventionally worded long arm statute in settlements of domestic disputes,
despite the commercial context of the statutory language. The
separation agreement itself manifested an act by the defendant in
the forum that was sufficiently commercial to be reconciled with the
statutory categories. The cases in the previous section determined
that the minimum contacts theory governed personal jurisdiction in
alimony actions, but those cases applied statutes whose language
was no barrier. A few courts have bridged the gap and have applied
narrowly worded statutes in alimony actions, or have found
jurisdiction in the absence of an applicable statute.
Wright v. Wright1 75 was an action by an abandoned New Jersey
wife against her non-resident husband. The New Jersey long arm
statute conferred jurisdiction over non-resident corporations, partnerships, and associations only.176 There was no statute that on its
face conferred jurisdiction over non-resident spouses in support
actions. Nevertheless, the New Jersey Superior Court, Chancery
Division, held that personal service on the husband outside the state
gave the court personal jurisdiction over him.
The court relied on J. W. Sparks & Co. v. Gallos,1 77 in which the
New Jersey Supreme Court had approved Professor Currie's
assertion that "there is no justification for limiting the [minimum
contacts] test to corporations for if it is fair to subject corporations
with business contacts in a state to legal action there, it is also fair
to do the same with respect to individuals 'similarly situated.' "T178
172. 193 Cal. App. 2d 443, 14 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1961).
173. 84 Nev. 268, 439 P.2d 679 (1968).
174. See text accompanying notes 66 to 99 supra.
175. 114 N.J. Super. 439, 276 A.2d 878 (1971).
176. N.J. CIv. PRAC. R. 4:4-4.
177. 47 N.J. 295, 220 A.2d 673 (1966).
178. Id. at 301, 220 A.2d at 676 (quoting Currie, The Growth of Long Arm: Eight
Years of Extended Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533, 561).
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But Sparks did not involve the New Jersey long arm statute. 1 79
There, the New Jersey Supreme Court was construing a New York
long arm statute that allowed jurisdiction over a defendant who
transacted business in the state, and was not expressly limited to
corporations. 80 Moreover, Sparks was an action arising out of the
defendant's business contacts with New York. Thus the superior
court in Wright expanded Sparks: it determined that in a New
Jersey action jurisdiction could be asserted over individual defendants "doing business in this State" (even though the New Jersey
statute was by its terms limited to corporate defendants) where the
state had a legitimate interest in protecting an abandoned spouse
and child.'

8

1

Wright was a marked departure from conventional analysis.
Despite the narrow wording of the statute, the court asserted that it
"[saw] no reason why ... long-arm jurisdiction should not be
available in a separate maintenance action against a non-resident
defendant, given an appropriate factual setting."' 8 2 In the case at
bar, the court believed that New Jersey's interest in protecting the
abandoned wife and child, and the defendant's occupation as a
columnist for a New Jersey newspaper, justified jurisdiction. l 3 The
minimum contacts test was satisfied, and the statute was not
allowed to limit jurisdiction so as to create an anomalous injustice.
Three of seven justices of the Nebraska Supreme Court adopted
similar reasoning in Stucky v. Stucky. 8 4 A wife was awarded a
divorce, alimony and support by a Nebraska court in 1969. The
parties maintained a home in Nebraska and lived there from 1961
until 1965, but the defendant husband had been absent from
Nebraska, except for two brief visits, from 1965 until 1969. The
plurality opinion noted that the defendant could be subject to in
personam jurisdiction because he failed to establish that he had
abandoned his Nebraska domicile. 8 5 A fourth justice concurred
179. Sparks was an action in New Jersey where the plaintiff sought full faith and
credit for a New York judgment. 47 N.J. at 297, 220 A.2d at 674. Thus the issue before

the New Jersey Supreme Court was whether jurisdiction in the New York action had
been properly exercised under the applicable New York long arm statute. Id.
180. Id. The statute was CiTY Civ. CT. ACT § 404 (McKinney 1963). Its provisions
were identical to N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 302 (McKinney 1972). See text accompanying
note 69 supra.
181. Wright v. Wright, 114 N.J. Super. 439, 443, 276 A.2d 878, 880 (1971).
182. Id.
183. Id. Interestingly, the court asserted that the minimum contacts test was
satisfied largely because the husband's newspaper column indicated that he was
doing business in New Jersey. Id.
184. 186 Neb. 636, 185 N.W.2d 656 (1971), noted in, 51 NEB. L. REV. 159 (1971).
185. Id. at 640, 185 N.W.2d at 659. Although the defendant had been away from
Nebraska for several years, he continued to make deposits in a joint checking account
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solely on this basis.1 8 6 But the plurality apparently preferred to base
the holding on long arm jurisdiction. 8 7 The Nebraska statute, which
was worded similarly to Maryland's, 88s allowed jurisdiction on the
basis of traditional long arm categories. 8 9 The plurality expressly
acknowledged that the statutory language did not cover alimony
and support actions. 19° Nevertheless, the three justices believed that
the statute manifested the legislature's intent to "apply the
minimum contacts rule" when it was constitutionally permissible to
do so.' 9' The plurality held "the minimum contacts concept . . . [to
be] peculiarly suited to marital support cases,' 92 because "'it is
reasonable and fair to require a defendant whose voluntary acts
have given rise to a cause of action in a state to litigate his
responsibility for that conduct at the place where it occurred.' "193 In
the case at bar, the minimum contacts concept was found to be
satisfied, because the last marital domicile was in Nebraska, and
because "the defendant continuously and systematically maintained
' 94
his family here thereafter."'
Although Wright v. Wright and Stucky v. Stucky asserted
jurisdiction based on the minimum contacts concept, both cases
placed some reliance on a narrowly worded long arm statute as an
1 95
expression of legislative authorization for expanded jurisdiction.
there. Credit and utility accounts continued to be in the defendant's name. Mortgage
payments were jointly made. The defendant and his wife continued to file joint
income tax returns, which listed the defendant's address as the joint home in
Nebraska. Id.
186. Id. at 647, 185 N.W.2d at 662-63 (Spencer, J., concurring).
187. Id. at 640-42, 185 N.W.2d at 659-60.
188. The Maryland long arm statute is quoted at text accompanying note 33 supra.

189.

NEB. REV. STAT.

§ 25-536 (1975).

190. 186 Neb. at 641, 185 N.W.2d at 659.
191. Id. at 641, 642, 185 N.W.2d at 659, 660.
192. Id. at 642, 185 N.W.2d at 660. See Foris v. Foris, 103 N.J. Super. 316, 247 A.2d
156 (1968).
193. 186 Neb. at 641-42, 185 N.W.2d at 660 (quoting Owens v. Superior Court, 52
Cal. 2d 822, 831, 345 P.2d 921, 925 (1959)).
194. 186 Neb. at 642, 185 N.W.2d at 660. See notes 184-85 and accompanying text
supra. The plurality's conclusion might be supported by another Nebraska statute,
which stated: "A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any other basis
authorized by law." NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-539 (1975). It is not entirely clear what is
meant by "authorized by law." To interpret "law" as statutory law would seem to
render the provision superfluous. If "law" is read to include decisional law, this
section might constitute legislative authority to expand personal jurisdiction as
permitted by the Supreme Court cases. The Stucky plurality cited this provision, 186
Neb. at 641, 185 N.W.2d at 659, but did not appear to rely on it.
I
Three justices dissented, accusing the plurality of "judicial legislation." Id. at
643, 185 N.W.2d at 660 (Newton, J., dissenting). The dissenters believed that minimum
contacts jurisdiction could be exercised only in areas expressly covered by statute. Id.
at 647, 185 N.W.2d at 662.
195. See text accompanying notes 175 to 180 and 184 to 193 supra.
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In Egbert v. Egbert,196 a New Jersey court asserted personal
jurisdiction over the defendant in an alimony action. No New Jersey
statute expressly authorized such jurisdiction. 197 The court in Egbert
stated that "[tihe jurisdiction this court asserts is not based on [any]
statute but on the facts found and case law cited.

'1

98

The court

recognized that "[tihe existence of a marital domicile in a state has
as many consequences as economic activity does .. . and should

satisfy due process requirements so as to permit in personam
jurisdiction for the award of alimony and child support against a
vagrant spouse." 199 The court apparently believed that the minimum
contacts cases alone justified jurisdiction.
Not all courts have accepted such expansive use of long arm
jurisdiction. In Doyle v. Doyle,"0 an intermediate appellate court in
Oregon affirmed an order vacating an alimony decree for lack of
jurisdiction over the defendant. At the time of the suit, Oregon had
22
no long arm statute. 2 1 The court declined to follow Soule v. Soule, 0
Mizner v. Mizner,203 and Hines v. Clendenning,20 4 noting that in
each of those cases, jurisdiction had been based on a broad long arm
statute. 20 5 The court recognized that Stucky v. Stucky 20 6 had asserted
jurisdiction even though no statute applied by its terms, but the
court declined to follow Stucky. The court felt that it was bound to
follow precedents of the Oregon Supreme Court and to hold that long
27
arm jurisdiction could not be exercised in alimony actions. 0
Interestingly, the court did not exclude the possibility that the
Oregon Supreme Court could approve such jurisdiction; it stated that
'' 2
the "change must be made by that court . . . or the legislature. 0s
196. 125 N.J. Super. 171, 309 A.2d 746 (1973).
197. See note 195 and accompanying text supra.
198. 125 N.J. Super. at 176, 309 A.2d at 749.
199. Id. at 175, 309 A.2d at 748 (citation omitted). The exact basis for the court's
holding is unclear. The court held that the husband was still domiciled in New Jersey.
Id. at 173, 309 A.2d at 747. This fact alone could have justified the jurisdiction. The
court also implied that it may have had continuing jurisdiction over him because of
an earlier proceeding. Id. at 173, 176, 309 A.2d at 747, 749. But the structure and
emphasis of the opinion indicates that the central rationale was minimum contact
jurisdiction.
200. 17 Or. App. 529, 522 P.2d 906 (1974).
201. Id. at 536, 522 P.2d at 909.
202. 193 Cal. App. 2d 443, 14 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1961). See text accompanying notes
101 to 113 supra.
203. 84 Nev. 268, 439 P.2d 679 (1968). See text accompanying notes 114 to 117
supra.
204. 465 P.2d 460 (Okla. 1970). See text accompanying notes 155 to 164 supra.
205. 17 Or. App. at 535-36, 522 P.2d at 909.
206. 186 Neb. 636, 185 N.W.2d 656 (1971). See notes 184 to 194 and accompanying
text supra.
207. 17 Or. App. at 535-36, 522 P.2d at 909.
208. Id. at 536, 522 P.2d at 909 (emphasis added).
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Thus it is arguable that the Doyle court would agree that long arm
jurisdiction could be asserted without specific legislative action.
THE TORT THEORY

One of the traditional categories of acts which confers long arm
jurisdiction over a defendant is his commission of a tortious act
within the forum state. 20 9 If it is accepted that a deserting spouse
wrongfully injures his or her spouse, it may be possible to assert
jurisdiction on this theory. In Poindexter v. Willis,21 0 a mother
obtained a judgment in Illinois under a paternity act. 211 The court
determined the defendant to be the child's father and ordered him to
pay support and maintenance. The appellate court sustained the
exercise of long arm jurisdiction, holding that failure to support the
child constituted a "tortious act" within the meaning of the Illinois
long arm statute. 21 2 The court relied on two major Illinois cases,
Nelson v. Miller,2 13 and Gray v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp.21 4 The Nelson court had rejected the defendant's
contention that jurisdiction for commission of a tortious act could be
exercised only after the plaintiff proved his right to recover in tort.
The case established the rather obvious proposition that, at the
jurisdictional determination stage, the plaintiff need only allege acts
committed by the defendant within the state and a proper cause of
action in tort.215 In Gray, the court held that a "tortious act" was
committed in Illinois when injury occurred in that state as a result of
negligent manufacture outside the state. 21 6 Both cases involved
causes of action that are conventionally categorized as tort actions.
The Poindexter court quoted language from Nelson and Gray that
indicated the words "tortious act" were not to be construed
restrictively, 217 and noted that the paternity act placed a duty on the
father to support his illegitimate child. 218 The court concluded:
[Tihe word "tortious" . . . is not restricted to the technical
definition of a tort, but includes any act committed in this
state which involves a breach of duty to another and makes
209. See, e.g., MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 6-103(b)(3) (1974).
210. 87 Ill. App. 2d 213, 231 N.E.2d 1 (1967).
3
211. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 106- /, §51-66 (1963).
212. 87 Ill. App. 2d at 218, 231 N.E.2d at 3. The Illinois long arm statute is Civil
Practice Act, § 17, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (Smith-Hurd 1968).
213. 11 Ill. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957).
214. 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
215. 11 Ill. 2d at 391-95, 143 N.E.2d at 680-82.
216. 22 Ill. 2d at 435-36, 176 N.E.2d at 762-63.
217. 87 Ill. App. 2d at 216-17, 231 N.E.2d at 3.
218. Id. at 216, 231 N.E.2d at 2.
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the one committing the act liable to [the] respondent in
damage . Therefore . . .the failure of the father to support an

illegitimate child constitutes a tortious act within the meaning of
the statute ....219
One commentator has suggested that the rationale of Poindexter
could be applied to an alimony action, if it is established that the law
220
of the forum state places a duty of support on the deserting spouse.
However, most courts that have addressed the issue have been
unwilling to construe the statutory language to apply to actions that
are not strictly torts. In Mroczynski v. McGrath,221 the court rejected
the contention that "the break-up of the family unit and the
attendant results ... [constitute] 'tortious conduct' ....-

"2

The

word "tortious" has a specific legal meaning and is therefore more
difficult to construe broadly than language about transacting
business.
THE MARYLAND CASES AND THE STATE OF THE MARYLAND LAW

In the cases involving application of long arm jurisdiction in the
traditional areas of tort and commercial litigation, the Maryland
Court of Appeals has examined the problem of the relationship
between the wording of the long arm statute and the constitutional
limitations. 223 In an early long arm case, the court stated that
[iut seems clear that the purpose of the Legislature in enacting
these new provisions was to give the courts of the State personal
jurisdiction over all out of state persons and corporations which
constitutionally could be reached as having had sufficient
Maryland contacts, under the jurisdictional yardstick established by the Supreme Court in cases such as InternationalShoe
Co. v. Washington,.. . McGee v. InternationalLife Ins. Co.,.
and Hanson v. Denckla ....224
As was discussed earlier, 225 such an equation of the statutory and
constitutional standards needs refinement if it is to be applied
meaningfully, because the long arm statute is more restrictive
219. Id. at 217-18, 231 N.E.2d at 3.
220. Long-Arm Jurisdiction,supra note 4, at 299.
221. 34 Ill.
2d 451, 216 N.E.2d 137 (1966); see text accompanying notes 59 to 62
supra.
222. 34 Ill.
2d at 455, 216 N.E.2d at 139-40. See also State ex rel. Carrington v.
Schutts, 217 Kan. 175, 535 P.2d 982 (1975), and authorities cited therein.
223. See text accompanying notes 39 to 48 supra.
224. Gilliam v. Moog Indus. Inc., 239 Md. 107, 111, 210 A.2d 390, 392 (1965)
(dictum).
225. See text accompanying notes 39 to 53 supra.
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than the minimum contacts test. The cases suggest that the Court of
Appeals is developing a solution. The court has not disregarded the
language of the statute; rather, in all of the cases, it has weighed the
226
applicability of one or more of the long arm categories to the facts.
But in Lamprecht v. Piper Aircraft Corp.,227 the court came to the

point:
The application of the long arm statute to a particular
situation entails dual considerations - first, that of statutory
construction and second, that of constitutionality. We have held
that the legislative purpose, to a great degree, was the expansion
of judicial jurisdiction up to but not beyond the outermost limits
permitted in this area by the due process decisions of the
Supreme Court. .

.

. Therefore, consideration of the constitu-

tional question in each case is essential not only for its own
purpose but also as a significant factor in the interpretationof
228
the statute.
And in Krashes v. White, 229 the court reaffirmed this approach:
Although six specific categories are listed in the subsections
of [the long arm statute], this Court has applied [the long arm
statute] flexibly, in order to carry out the legislative intent of
extending the personal jurisdiction of Maryland courts as far as
is possible consistent with the Due Process Clause ....
Perhaps fact situations will arise which will be deemed
outside the scope of the . . . statute, although there may be a

constitutional basis for jurisdiction over the nonresident
defendant. Nevertheless, the prior decisions of this Court make it
clear that the reach of the statute will largely depend upon
whether Maryland in personam jurisdiction may be asserted
under the Fourteenth Amendment. 230
These statements provide a sound method for giving force to the
legislative purpose without overreaching the bounds of the legislation. The two steps, statutory construction and constitutional
226. See, e.g., Groom v. Margulies, 257 Md. 691, 265 A.2d 249 (1970); Harris v.
Arlen Properties, 256 Md. 185, 260 A.2d 22 (1969); Vitro Elec. v. Milgray Elec., Inc., 255
Md. 498, 258 A.2d 749 (1969); Novack v. National Hot Rod Ass'n, 247 Md. 350, 231
A.2d 22 (1967).
227. 262 Md. 126, 277 A.2d 272 (1971).
228. Id. at 130, 277 A.2d at 275 (emphasis added).
229. 275 Md. 549, 341 A.2d 798 (1975).
230. Id. at 558-59, 341 A.2d at 803-04.

260

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 37

analysis, must both be performed, but to some extent they may be
performed together. The result of the constitutional inquiry is a
factor in the application of the statutory language.
The Maryland Court of Appeals has decided several cases
involving application of long arm jurisdiction in domestic relations
situations. The first such case, which has been discussed previously, 231 was Van Wagenberg v. Van Wagenberg.232 There, the
court afforded full faith and credit to a New York judgment on a
separation agreement. 233 The Maryland Court of Appeals analyzed
the jurisdictional basis of the New York judgment, and concluded
that long arm jurisdiction had properly been exercised. 234 The court
reached this conclusion by determining that, under New York law,
the execution of a separation agreement in New York constituted
"transaction of business" within the meaning of the New York long
235
arm statute.
Although Van Wagenberg involved interpretation of New York
law, it has become a significant Maryland precedent. After
examining the New York cases, the Maryland court decided that
"transaction of business within the state" was not limited to
"business" of a commercial nature, but "includ[ed] . . .contracts of
any kind made within the state, and 'purposeful activity' of any
kind, within the state. ' 236 The court has apparently adopted this
position as a part of Maryland law.237 In one case, the court stated:
We held in Van Wagenberg that the acts done within a State
which will support in personam jurisdiction as transacting "any
business" are not necessarily limited to acts which are a part of
commerce or of transactions for profit, but include acts which
238
constitute a purposeful activity within the State.
Furthermore, at the time of the Van Wagenberg decision, New York
had not yet applied its long arm statute to actions based on
separation agreements. In fact, one opinion by an intermediate
appellate court in New York, Willis v. Willis, 239 had held the long
arm statute to be inapplicable. The Maryland court chose to refute
231. See text accompanying notes 76 to 82 supra.
232. 241 Md. 154, 215 A.2d 812 (1966).
233. See text accompanying notes 76 to 82 supra.
234. 241 Md. at 162-72, 215 A.2d at 816-22.
235. Id. at 166-72, 215 A.2d at 818-22.
236. Id. at 166, 215 A.2d at 818.
237. Harris v. Arlen Properties, 256 Md. 185, 197-98, 260 A.2d 22, 28 (1969); Novack
v. National Hot Rod Ass'n, 247 Md. 350, 356, 231 A.2d 22, 26 (1967).
238. Novack v. National Hot Rod Ass'n, 247 Md. 350, 356, 231 A.2d 22, 26 (1967).
239. 42 Misc. 2d 473, 248 N.Y.S.2d 260 (Sup. Ct. 1964).

1977]

THE ABANDONED SPOUSE

expressly the reasoning of Willis and to draw from New York cases
in other contexts. 240 Thus the court further strengthened the
suggestion that it was prepared to hold that an action based on a
separation agreement could be brought under the Maryland long
arm statute.
The next Maryland case to deal with the domestic relations area
was Renwick v. Renwick. 241 A former wife brought an action to
enforce, inter alia, a New Jersey support and alimony decree. The
New Jersey court had exercised long arm jurisdiction on the
authority of Wright v. Wright242 and Egbert v. Egbert.24 3 These
cases held long arm jurisdiction to be properly exercised solely on
the basis of the minimum contacts theory, without any clear
statutory mandate. 244 The Maryland Court of Special Appeals

afforded the judgment full faith and credit, expressing no doubt as to
the validity of those decisions. The court cited Van Wagenberg as
establishing that "[tihe Court of Appeals has found constitutional a
sister state's expansion of in personam out-of-state service beyond
the business sphere and subject areas specifically delineated in the
long-arm statute." 245 This expansive interpretation of Van Wagenberg suggests that the Maryland Court of Special Appeals would
find long arm jurisdiction warranted in alimony actions.
The unusual case of Geelhoed v. Jensen246 is also of significance. The plaintiff, a Maryland domiciliary, brought suit for
criminal conversation against a California domiciliary who had
resided in Maryland for two years, during which he had allegedly
become the paramour of the plaintiffs wife. The plaintiff was
prepared to prove only one act of sexual intercourse, which had
taken place in Canada. The plaintiff relied on the subsection of the
Maryland long arm statute that provides for exercise of jurisdiction
based on causing "tortious injury . . .by an act . . . outside of the
state if [the defendant] . . .engages in any . . . persistent course of

conduct in the state .... ",247 Asserting the principle of ejusdem
generis, the defendant urged that the "persistent course of conduct"
must involve commercial activity. Once again, the Maryland Court
of Appeals rejected this argument. 248 The court stated that "IwIhen
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

241 Md. 154, 170-71, 215 A.2d 812, 821 (1966).
24 Md. App. 277, 330 A.2d 488 (1975).
114 N.J. Super. 439, 276 A.2d 878 (1971).
125 N.J. Super. 171, 309 A.2d 746 (1973).
See text accompanying notes 175 to 182 & 196 to 199 supra.
24 Md. App. at 288, 330 A.2d at 495.
277 Md. 220, 352 A.2d 818 (1976).
MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §6-103(b)(4).
277 Md. at 225-27, 352 A.2d at 822.
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terms having a relatively flexible quality. . . are used in the statute,
they necessarily take their meaning from [the] legislative purpose. In
the case of the long arm statute, such terms are meant to be
'249
coextensive with the requirements of due process.
Although Geelhoed was, strictly speaking, a tort action, it
involved the marital relationship. The court's probing analysis of
the constitutional issue in this context is particularly important.
After carefully analyzing the Supreme Court decisions, the court
stated:
The principal contacts of [the defendant] with the State
arose from his residence in the State for two years, albeit while
he apparently retained a California domicile. [His] contacts with
the State, however, were not of a passing nature; his home in
Maryland was his principal place of abode for two years, and
one of his two places of business was likewise located in the
State. Working and maintaining one's principal residence in the
State would seem as a general proposition to constitute engaging
in a "persistent course of conduct" in the State and satisfy due
2
process in the case of a natural person. 5
251
These contacts satisfied the requirements of Hanson v. Denckla,
because "[olne who resides in a state necessarily avails himself of
the benefits and protections of its laws. The taking up of residence is
. . . the quintessential act by which one avails himself of the
privilege of conducting activities in the state. 2 5 2 In addition, the
Court of Appeals noted that "it is significant that Maryland has a
special interest in the domestic relations of its citizens and therefore
in providing a forum for them to remedy alleged wrongs to those
relations. ' 25 3 This analysis would seem to be equally applicable to a
vagrant spouse.
In a recent case, Bartell v. Bartell,254 the Maryland Court of
Appeals declined an opportunity to rule on the applicability of the
long arm statute in an alimony suit. The Bartells had resided in
Maryland as a married couple for twenty-two years when Dr. Bartell
abruptly abandoned his wife and daughters and left for Canada.
Mrs. Bartell instituted suit in Maryland for alimony and support,
and the trial court entered judgment in her favor. 255 The Court of

249. Id. at 226-27, 352 A.2d at 822.

250. Id. at 230, 352 A.2d at 824.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

357 U.S. 235 (1958).
277 Md. at 231, 352 A.2d at 825.
Id. at 233, 352 A.2d at 826.
278 Md. 12, 357 A.2d 343 (1976).
Id. at 16, 357 A.2d at 345.
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Special Appeals reversed, primarily on the ground that Dr. Bartell's
deposition had been erroneously excluded from a jurisdictional
hearing. 25 6 Before the Court of Appeals, the plaintiff-appellant
argued that the long arm statute was applicable. 257 But the Court of
Appeals reversed on the ground that the deposition had been
properly excluded, 258 making no mention of the long arm issue.
The Maryland cases that have been discussed here have clearly
laid the groundwork for applying the long arm statute against the
vagrant spouse. The Court of Appeals has indicated that, at least
where the statutory words are broad and generic, the statute is to be
construed broadly, with reference to the minimum contacts analysis.259 In the Geelhoed case, the court analyzed one such broad long
arm phrase, "persistent course of conduct," with reference to
constitutional standards, and found it to be satisfied where the
defendant had lived and worked in Maryland for two years. 26° Where
a defendant has lived within the marital relationship in Maryland,
he or she might be said to have "transacted business" in Maryland
by a similar analysis. The court has indicated that the "business"
involved need not be commercial, 26 1 and that it might include any
"acts which constitute a purposeful activity in the State. ' 26 2 More
generally, a reading of the cases suggests that the court has become
increasingly unwilling to allow the specific long arm categories to
have an unnecessarily restrictive effect where the minimum contacts
analysis indicates that jurisdiction is warranted.
If the constitutional requirements are used as the primary
measure, the only major barrier to extension of jurisdiction to
alimony cases would seem to be the concept that physical power is
263
it
the foundation of jurisdiction. As was noted early in this article,
is not clear that this concept has completely disappeared. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's decision in Shaffer v. Heitner,264 which
ruled that the minimum contacts analysis of InternationalShoe is to
control the assertion of jurisdiction in all situations, should dispel
any lingering doubts about the demise of Pennoyer. Freed from
Pennoyer's concept of physical power, a court should experience no
difficulty in asserting jurisdiction over a defendant whose relationship with the forum consists only of previous domicile and of having
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

Bartell v. Bartell, 28 Md. App. 180, 187-92, 344 A.2d 139, 144-46 (1975).
Brief for Appellant at 7-9, Bartell v. Bartell, 278 Md. 12, 357 A.2d 343 (1976).
Bartell v. Bartell, 278 Md. 12, 357 A.2d 343 (1976).
See text accompanying notes 224 to 230 supra.
See text accompanying notes 250 to 253 supra.
See text accompanying notes 231 to 238 supra.
Novack v. National Hot Rod Ass'n, 247 Md. 350, 356, 231 A.2d 22, 26 (1967).
See note 25 and accompanying text supra.
45 U.S.L.W. 4849 (U.S. June 24, 1977).
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previously married, lived, and worked in the forum. Indeed, at least
one of the cases discussed here has suggested that former domicile
has strong significance.2 65 Furthermore, the various factors that
play a part in the Supreme Court's constitutional analysis all tend to
266
indicate that jurisdiction is warranted.

The ultimate decision will involve an element of "sociological
jurisprudence"; that is, the Maryland court's view of its own role as
necessitating a response "to demands for change not yet embodied
in legislation." 267 If the court views judicial decision-making as "a
social tool to be judicially modified from time to time so as to meet
changing societal needs,

'266

it may extend jurisdiction because of the

clear need to protect deserted spouses. If the court considers this
response unwarranted judicial law-making, it will be reluctant to go
so far.
The law of "statutory construction" is rather ambiguous. 269 No
attempt will be made here to examine the many "canons" of
statutory construction that might bear on the issue. 270 Nevertheless,
it may be suggested briefly that application of the long arm statute
in an alimony case is acceptable statutory construction, and not
271
improper judicial law-making. The statute is essentially remedial:
it was enacted to provide a forum for Maryland plaintiffs who have
been wronged by the actions of foreign defendants. The need for
such redress is as equally pressing in domestic relations cases as it is
in commercial cases. The Maryland Court of Appeals has adopted a
flexible approach to the statute which suggests that the statute does
not clearly forbid its application by negative implication. Where
265. See text accompanying notes 106 to 113 supra.
266. See text accompanying notes 54 to 57 supra.
267. Daynard, The Use of Social Policy in JudicialDecision-Making,56 CORNELL
L. REV. 919, 919 (1971). 268. Yarbrough, Mr. Justice Black and Legal Positivism, 57 VA. L. REV. 375, 383
(1971).
269. "The hard truth of the matter is that American courts have no intelligible,
generally accepted, and consistently applied theory of statutory interpretation." H.
HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 1201 (Tentative Edition 1958). See generally
Witherspoon, Administrative Discretion to Determine Statutory Meaning: "The High
Road" 35 TEX. L. REV. 63 (1956); Witherspoon, Administrative Discretion to
Determine Statutory Meaning: "The Low Road", 38 TEX. L. REV. 392 (1960);
Witherspoon, Administrative Discretion to Determine Statutory Meaning: "The
Middle Road": 1, 40 TEX. L. REV. 751 (1962).
270. See generally Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and
the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395
(1950).
271. It is frequently asserted that remedial statutes are to be liberally construed. 3
A. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 60-01 (4th ed. C. Sands
1974). This includes statutes which extend jurisdiction. Id. at §§ 67.03 & .04.
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there is a clear need for application beyond the most literal context
of the statute, and the statutory language does not clearly forbid
such expansion, courts have found extension of the statute to be
warranted in a variety of situations. 272 Professor Dickerson summarized this process in his recent study of application of legislation:
Suppose the relevant original legislative intent, which is not
disclosed by the statute when read in its proper context, is
directly and reliably disclosed by the legislative history or
otherwise. Here, it would seem appropriate for the court to create
a rule of law consistent with that intent, unless it determined
that to do so would be significantly incompatible with related
273
statutory law.
Professor Dickerson acknowledges that such an approach must
be used with caution; in general, there is "no room for serving
current social needs by overriding reasonably inferable legislative
intent.
...
274 But where the legislative purpose is clear, "[t]he basic
idea is to further the manifest legislative purpose as consistently as
'275
possible with the statute and the rest of the legal order.
CONCLUSION

There is a clear need for resolution of the problems of
jurisdiction in domestic relations cases, and particularly in alimony
actions against vagrant spouses. Despite the persistence of some
problems, the cases collected in this article establish a broad-based
judicial consensus that the long arm statutes may properly provide a
solution. The need for this step was well expressed by one court:
"Rapid technological developments improving the speed and
facility of transportation necessitate an expanded scope of
jurisdiction. The inconvenience and hardship experienced in
requiring resort to a foreign forum, the cost of which could
inhibit the plaintiff-spouse from ever bringing any action and
financially dilute whatever award the spouse might win. ...
[Tihe convenience of hearing the action where the cause of
action arose; the enjoyment, by the departed spouse, of the
rights and protections of the matrimonial state while residing
in that state; the contraction of the marriage and residence

272. See R.

DICKERSON, THE

INTERPRETATION

AND

APPLICATION OF STATUTES

198-205 (1975).
273. Id. at 243.
274. Id. at 245 (emphasis added).

275. Id. at 244. See 2 A.

SUTHERLAND,

supra note 271, at § 55.02.
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in the marital state and the consequent obligations arising
therefrom . ..."

The last matrimonial domicile would seem to be the proper
forum where divorce, support and custody cases can be litigated.
The existence of a marital domicile in a state has as many
consequences as economic activity ....276
During the past century, the law of personal jurisdiction has been in
an evolutionary state. The Court of Appeals should be reluctant to
interpret Maryland's long arm statute in a wooden fashion, at least
in those cases in which such an approach would cause manifest
injustice.
276. Egbert v. Egbert, 125 N.J. Super. 171, 175, 309 A.2d 746, 748 (1973) (quoting 1
RUT.-CAM.

L.J. 117, 128 (1969)).

